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Troubled Memories: Researching Holocaust 
Testimony 
 
By Jennifer Anne Duke  
 
 
Abstract: Modernity’s largest episode of mass killing occurred 
between the years 1931 to 1945, throughout which over forty-five 
million people died. The Holocaust, the Nazi experiment into 
industrialized mass murder during World War II, was responsible 
for a significant portion of these deaths, including the deaths of six 
million Jews, from which the term “genocide” was coined. 
Experiences documented by hundreds of survivors can be seen in 
documentaries and films or read about in books. But the 
psychology behind the testimonies is not so often discussed. This 
essay will use Harvard-educated professor and Holocaust scholar 
Lawrence Langer’s Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory 
as a framework for investigating examples of the five types of 
memories recorded in eight books by seven Holocaust survivors. 
By understanding the five different types of memory (deep, 
anguished, humiliated, tainted, and unheroic) expressed by 
Holocaust survivors in their testimony, one can better understand 




Lawrence Langer is a well-respected scholar who specializes in 
Holocaust testimonies and how best to understand them. In his first 
book on Holocaust testimony, Preempting the Holocaust, Langer 
articulates his purpose for the book and the importance of reading 
survivors’ testimonies: “When I speak of preempting the 
Holocaust, I mean using, and perhaps abusing, its grim details to 
fortify a prior commitment to an ideal of moral reality, community 






faith in their pristine value in a post–Holocaust world.”1 California 
State University, San Bernardino professor Timothy Pytell further 
explains Langer’s view of “preempting the Holocaust”: “His focus 
on Holocaust preemption focuses on attempting to stay honest and 
truthful in the face of the extreme experience and the cultural 
rupture that is the Holocaust.”2 In Langer’s later book entitled 
Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory, he examines his 
ideas further and introduces five types of memory that exist in the 
testimonies included in his book: deep, anguished, humiliated, 
tainted, and unheroic memories. These types of memories can also 
be found in other survivors’ testimonies as well, such as Victor 
Frankl of Austria, Primo Levi of Italy, Gerda Weissman-Klein of 
Poland, Olga Lengyel of Hungary, Elie Wiesel of Romania, 
Charlotte Delbo of France, and Felix Weinberg of Czechoslovakia. 
Holocaust survivor Victor Frankl provides his interpretation of 
Holocaust testimonies as well, introducing the concept of “the 
delusion of reprieve,” “emotional death,” and resilience. The 
voices of Holocaust survivors can be heard by reading and 
listening to their testimonies which offer not only information but 
personal insight. Understanding their testimonies is imperative to 
understanding the immortal implications of one of history’s most 
notorious acts of genocide. 
 Before further exploring deep, anguished, humiliated, 
tainted, and unheroic memories hidden within several different 
pieces of Holocaust testimony, it is important to understand the 
differences between oral and written testimonies. While both are 
useful in investigating and understanding testimony, the latter may 
be more valuable, especially when examining more painful and 
troubling memories. With written testimonies, survivors can 
explain their experiences in a way that the reader will better 
understand. The literary devices, such as metaphors and idioms, 
that are prevalent in written testimonies may help the reader 
 
1 Timothy Pytell, “Revisiting Preempting the Holocaust: Frankl vs. Levi,” 
Psychology Today (December 18, 2017). 
2 Pytell. 
 




imagine and picture the experience of the survivor, bringing them 
closer to what the experience was really like. Langer introduces 
this concept by analyzing the rich literature provided in the written 
testimony of Holocaust survivor Barbara T: “We are dragged out 
of cattle cars, vomited into an impenetrable black night...screams 
knife the air and I cover my ears with my hands. Torches keep 
licking the sky like rainbows.”3  
With oral and recorded testimonies, this is much harder to 
do. The same woman, Barbara T., also had a recorded video 
testimony in which the same experience is relayed by saying, “the 
inmates whipped us out of cattle cars.”4 While writing about their 
experiences, some survivors used literary devices such as the 
simile used in the above example. Others used different methods to 
appeal to readers’ emotions. Charlotte Delbo (1913–1985), a non-
Jewish French resistance fighter imprisoned in Auschwitz, used 
poetry in her three books, compiled into the trilogy Auschwitz and 
After. Despite her different writing style, her goal is the same: to 
paint a vivid picture, not just give a testimony. In the first of these 
three books, Delbo uses these literary devices to explain her 
memory of the Auschwitz extermination camp:  
 
My memory is more bloodless than an autumn leaf. 
My memory has forgotten the dew. 
My memory is drained of its sap. My memory has 
bled to death. 
This is when the heart ought to stop beating—stop 
beating—come to a stop.5 
 
Written testimonies can also reveal things that might have 
otherwise remained undiscussed because there is only one party 
 
3 Langer, Holocaust Testimonies: the Ruins of Memory (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2007), 18. 
4 Ibid., 18. 







involved and the testimony is not typically subject to outside or 
third-party influence. One potential problem that can come from a 
third-party influence is understood by referencing the legal term 
“leading the witness,” which is often present in oral testimonies, 
but not present in written testimonies. Langer explains that  
 
former victims are not the only ones threatened by 
the ordeal of oral testimony. The subtle urging of 
the interviewer can lead a witness to shift from one 
form of memory to another, and control and shape 
the content of each.6 
  
Written testimonies might also be easier to share than oral 
testimonies since they are not told in person to someone living in 
contemporary society, who may have a very different moral code. 
Therefore, written testimonies are not subject to judgment by an 
interviewer, and because of this, more of the experience may be 
included in the written testimonies. In oral testimonies, 
interviewers may judge some of the witnesses’ former actions, or 
perhaps the witness feels that they might, despite the actions 
having been done out of necessity and the instinct to survive. 
Polish sociologist and philosopher Zygmunt Bauman (1925–2017) 
states that “the lesson of the Holocaust is the facility with which 
most people, put into a situation that does not contain a good 
choice...argue themselves away from the issue of moral 
duty...adopting instead the precepts of self-preservation.”7 
Survivors may intentionally or unintentionally omit information 
that they deem not part of their natural character and just 
something that they had to do in the interests of self-preservation.  
Alternatively, they may alter that information, or become 
upset by the information. One such example is understood through 
the testimony of a Jesuit priest who was asked by an interviewer 
“why he did not say something to someone about what he had 
 
6 Langer, 9. 
7 Ibid., 11. 
 




seen. Suddenly before our eyes he is wrestling with the deep 
memory of his inaction, which common memory clearly 
disapproves of today.”8 Another example can be witnessed in 
Primo Levi’s (1919–1987) essay “Shame.” When discussing 
inaction in hindsight, he states that, “this is a judgment that the 
survivor believes he sees in the eyes of those who listen to his 
stories and judge with facile hindsight, or who perhaps feel cruelly 
repelled. Consciously or not, he feels accused and judged, 
compelled to justify and defend himself.”9  
Videotaped testimony has its value as well, as it helps to 
put a face to a story. Just the presence of the survivor on camera 
can have a moving effect on someone watching who may then be 
more inclined to identify with the struggles of the survivor and 
their emotional turmoil. Because of this, oral testimony likely 
maintains a stronger appeal to the empathy of the person watching 
than written testimony would. Nevertheless, the best way to 
observe and understand testimony about the Holocaust is to 
investigate both written and oral testimony simultaneously. 
 
Part One: Deep Memory and the Diminished Self  
 
“Deep memory” refers to the memory that gets embedded into the 
subconscious mind, that only resurfaces once triggered. Everyone 
has these memories, but to survivors of the Holocaust, these 
memories are often traumatic. Langer calls the memories that 
reside in the subconscious “deep memory,” which differs greatly 
from the idea of “common memory,” the type of memory that 
resides in the conscious mind; this kind of memory is easier to 
retrieve. Langer quotes Delbo to emphasize this point: “The skin 
covering the memory of Auschwitz is tough. Sometimes, however, 
it bursts, and gives back its contents.”10 Langer explains this 
 
8 Langer, 31. 
9 Primo Levi, “Shame,” in The Drowned and the Saved (New York: Simon & 
Schuster Paperbacks, 1986), 64. 






concept more in the introduction he wrote for Delbo’s Holocaust 
memoir, Auschwitz and After:  
 
[Delbo] developed a crucial distinction to help us 
discriminate between two operations of memory, 
speaking of the ‘me’ of now, living under control of 
what I translate as ‘common memory’, and the ‘me’ 
of then, the Auschwitz ‘me’, living under the 
dominion of deep memory.11 
  
Delbo explains this further when she states that she lives a 
double life, and without that split existence she would not be able 
to survive. Some years after liberation, Delbo traveled back across 
France to visit the women she was imprisoned with; these women 
all describe the same feeling. Nothing seemed real to them.12 It can 
be understood by reading Delbo’s memoir that a part of them still 
felt like they were back there, still in Auschwitz, and still in 
danger. In one of her poems, Delbo writes, “I’ve come back from 
another world and I know not which one is real, as far as I’m 
concerned, I’m still there, dying there.”13 
Scholar Robert Jay Lifton, who has studied the Holocaust 
extensively and wrote several pieces on it, calls this process 
“doubling,” an event that he describes as “an active psychological 
process, a means of adaptation to extremity.”14 Lifton attributes 
this act of doubling to perpetrators of the Holocaust rather than 
victims, stating that it is how they were able to commit such 
heinous acts. According to Lifton, “The way in which doubling 
allowed Nazi doctors to avoid guilt was not by the elimination of 
conscience but by what can be called the transfer of conscience. 
 
11 Delbo, Auschwitz and After, xviii. 
12 Ibid., 337–346. 
13 Ibid., 224. 
14 Robert Lifton, “The Nazi Doctors,” in Problems in European Civilization: 
The Holocaust, ed. Donald Niewyk (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
2003), 66. 
 




The requirements of conscience were transferred to the Auschwitz 
self, thereby freeing the original self from responsibility for actions 
there.”15 Proof that many of the worst Nazis “doubled” is seen in 
the Nuremberg trials, where several war criminals stated that the 
acts committed were committed in a state of war, and therefore 
cannot make them guilty of breaking any laws. The common 
excuse of “I was just following orders” is a clear example that 
post–war, they no longer identified with the other part of 
themselves, a part that existed in a state of war but not after.  
Although Lifton attributes doubling to the perpetrators, the 
act of doubling is seen in Holocaust survivors as well as survivors 
of other kinds of trauma. Instead of having trouble distinguishing 
between their “war self” and “original self,” however, they have 
trouble distinguishing between their original self and their post-
trauma self. Their post-trauma self can also be referred to as their 
“diminished self” which will be explored later in the article. Many 
Holocaust survivors struggled to find a will to live after their 
experience under their Nazi overlords. One of the ways they did so 
was by burying the memory associated with their trauma. For 
example, Delbo explains how she goes about her daily life while 
retaining these troubling memories: “I’m living without being 
alive. I do what I must, because I must, because that’s what people 
do.”16 These debilitating and traumatizing experiences live in the 
person’s deep memory where the post-trauma self will eventually 
reside. 
 Deep memory is repressed by the mind for self-
preservation, but it reappears when the survivor unintentionally 
calls upon it. In his memoir, Boy 30529, Felix Weinberg recalls his 
deep memory. The pathos, or emotional appeal, that he uses in his 
writing shows that recalling the memories at the back of his mind 
pains him but claims that his memoir is written by him solely to 
honor the memory of his mother who perished in the camps. This 
type of repressed memory lives on long past liberation, an event 
 
15 Lifton, 65–66. 






that was not entirely a relief to him. He states, “Nine days after my 
seventeenth birthday, my [physical] life was given back to me, 
[but] the camps changed me permanently.”17 Deep memory 
residing in the subconscious mind of Weinberg brought back 
uncharacteristic feelings and actions that he had to adapt to 
survive; this is the “skin,” or “other self,” that Delbo refers to. The 
person writing the memoir or recalling their deep memory is not 
the same as they were during their imprisonment in the camps. 
Common memory operates on the surface, as the players in a play, 
but deep memory is always there in the background, running the 
lights and sounds backstage. 
 
Part Two: Anguished Memory and the Divided Self 
 
Although similar to deep memory, “anguished memory,” or “the 
divided self,” focuses more on the confusion about the two 
different lives—the pre and post-trauma lives of the Holocaust 
survivors—and how it affects their testimonies. Langer introduces 
two facets of survivors’ personalities which he calls the “lived 
event” and “died event” personalities. He describes the “lived 
event” personality as the one that lives in the present and blends in 
with the current society and adheres to current societal norms. He 
calls the “died event” personality the one that clings to the life 
once lived, the Holocaust experience, and the survivors’ stories of 
survival.18  
Numerous survivor testimonies explain anguished memory 
in the same way that Langer explains it. In their testimonies, they 
state that there are two different realities that they live with daily. 
One is their contemporary personality, which goes to work every 
day, raises children, and attends parties, as well as participates in 
everyday life. The other personality is the one who lived and 
survived the Holocaust. That personality is never really gone and is 
a prime example of what Langer would refer to as the “died 
 
17 Felix Weinberg, Boy 30529: A Memoir (London: Verso, 2014), 14. 
18 Langer, 69. 
 




personality.”19 One survivor included in Langer’s book states in 
her testimony that in order to live again, she had to die in the 
camps, if not physically then emotionally and spiritually. Bessie K, 
whose infant was taken from her and killed by Nazis, remarried 
after liberation and raised a family. She states: “In order to survive, 
I think I had to die first. I was born on that train and I died on that 
train.”20 Delbo’s explanation is very similar to Bessie’s. She wrote, 
“If I confuse the dead and the living, with whom do I belong? 
Everything was false, and I was in despair at having lost the 
faculty of dreaming, of harboring illusions. This is the part of me 
that died in Auschwitz. This is what turned me into a ghost.”21 
Another example of a lived and died event in a survivor is 
seen in the testimony presented by Magda F., who was deported at 
first to Auschwitz-Birkenau in 1944. Despite this late departure, 
she was still sent to five different camps and upon returning to 
Hungary after liberation, she found out that almost all of her family 
had died. The only survivors were two of her brother-in-laws. She 
married one of them and he had a significant amount of trouble 
separating his two lives, or his lived event and died event. In her 
testimony, Magda F. recalls,  
 
My daughter told me one day, ‘Mom, I don’t think 
in dad’s eyes I am Ellen. I am still Eva. And my 
brother is not Tommy, he is Freddie.’ That was not 
the truth, but his mind was still back in the same 
story, and those two children he saw were Fred and 
Eva.22  
 
His children from his first marriage, Fred and Eva, had been killed 
in the gas chambers during the Holocaust, and his split mind had 
trouble sorting his old life from his new one, where his children’s 
 
19 Langer, 69. 
20 Weinberg, 49 







names were Tommy and Ellen. One survivor compared the two 
realities to a feeling of being on two different planets:  
 
We [survivors] have these double lives. You have 
one vision of life and I have two. I—you know—I 
lived on two planets…we were herded onto Hitler’s 
planet of annihilation zones and torture and 
slaughter areas, and herded back again, while no 
longer having anything in common with the 
inhabitants of this planet. And we had to relearn 
how to live again.23  
 
Another example of this incredible difference in the two 
lives that anguished memory represents is seen in the testimony of 
another unnamed woman who survived the Holocaust. She “saw” 
two different versions of the same sun. While on the train to one of 
the camps, the woman looked out of the small, barred window and 
saw a family at the station dressed in normal clothing and the sun 
was high in the sky and bright and beautiful. In her testimony, she 
compared that image to paradise. However, she saw that same sun 
rise every day while in Auschwitz, and it did not represent the 
same thing; it is like it was an entirely different sun: “I saw the sun 
in Auschwitz, I saw the sun come up, because we had to get up at 
four in the morning. But it was never beautiful to me. I never saw 
it shine. It was just the beginning of a horrible day.”24 Langer cites 
an additional comment on the significance of the sun as it pertains 
to an anguished memory from another survivor’s memoir: “I swear 
to you, the sun was not bright. The sun was red, or it was black to 
me...the sun was never life to me. It was destruction. It was never 
beautiful.”25 
Based on the content in his book, Man’s Search for 
Meaning, author and Holocaust survivor Viktor Frankl (1905–
 
23 Langer, 53. 
24 Ibid., 55. 
25 Ibid., 105. 
 




1997) uses his own experience gathered while in camps such as 
Auschwitz and Dachau to describe the various psychological 
stages that prisoners went through from the point of their arrival to 
the point of their selection for death. These psychological 
processes often cause anguished memory to appear later, as trauma 
is stored in the unconscious mind to allow the physiological body 
to survive. 
The first stage, according to Frankl, is made up of a 
psychological condition called “the delusion of reprieve,” or the 
psychological state where “the condemned man, immediately 
before his execution, gets the illusion that he might be reprieved at 
any moment.”26 Prisoners were hopeful of their treatment and 
began bargaining with their minds that maybe their situation would 
not be so bad. For example, Weinberg describes how the Jewish 
prisoners in the Theresienstadt ghetto, including his parents, 
repeatedly heard the news of what awaited them in the other camps 
once they were transported like those who came before them. Most 
shook it off and said things like, “it couldn’t possibly be much 
worse than being here!”27 They were sadly mistaken. Once 
deported to camps, the likelihood of surviving until liberation was 
very minimal.  
Unfortunately, this idea of reprieve made the Nazis’ killing 
much easier. As author Isaiah Trunk (1905–1981) explains in his 
essay, “Why the Jewish Councils Cooperated,” “the instinct of 
self-preservation, which prompts people to resist the thought of 
imminent destruction and to cling to even a spark of hope played 
into the hands of the executioners.”28 The Nazis kept the façade up 
until the last possible second. When trains were boarded, the 
prisoners were told they would be resettled. Of course, this was a 
lie. When trains arrived, they were told they would be separated 
 
26 Viktor E. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 
2017), 110. 
27 Weinberg, 19. 
28 Isaiah Trunk, “Why the Jewish Councils Cooperated,” in Problems in 
European Civilization: The Holocaust, edited by Donald Niewyk. (Boston, MA: 






from their families for only a short while. In the undressing room 
immediately before the gas chamber, they were told to make sure 
to keep their clothes and shoes together to find them afterward. In 
the moving Holocaust documentary film, Shoah (1985), directed 
by Claude Lanzmann (1925–2018), a witness even recalled that SS 
guards would sometimes ask arriving prisoners their professions, 
and tell them, “we need you for the war effort,” only to send them 
to their deaths minutes later.29 Desperate to cling to hope, most 
prisoners willingly entered the gas chambers. According to Delbo, 
hope even helped kill some prisoners:  
 
Every day we witnessed death of this one or that, at 
the end of their tether, who might have lived had 
they been liberated on that day. They died as a 
result of the emotion, and the disappointment. Died 
of having allowed hope to beat in their hearts.30 
  
After Frankl’s “delusion of reprieve” comes the sobering 
second stage, the “emotional death.”31 This stage coincides with 
Langer’s idea of the “died event”: “the prisoner who had passed 
onto the second stage of his psychological reactions did not avert 
his eyes anymore. When the prisoner passed between the first and 
second phase of relative apathy, he achieved a kind of emotional 
death.”32 The emotional death is what split the lived and died 
event, the self from the diminished self. According to Frankl, this 
split often happened within the prisoners’ first few days at the 
camp, again, suppressing traumatic memories to enable the 
physical body to survive. 
For Gerda Weissman-Klein (b. 1924), an eighteen-year-old 
Jewish girl who grew up in Bielitz, Poland, the emotional death 
 
29 Shoah, directed by Claude Lanzmann  (1985; New York, NY: New Yorker 
Films, April 1985). 
30 Delbo, Auschwitz and After, 204. 
31 Frankl, 110. 
32 Langer, 20–21. 
 




happened after she was split from her family. In her memoir 
entitled All but My Life, Weissman-Klein remembers the years 
before her deportation to the camps. First, she witnessed many of 
the townspeople in Bielitz shout “Heil Hitler” and wave Nazi flags 
above their homes, celebrating the Germans as liberators.33 Things 
changed quickly for Weissman-Klein and her family. When her 
father and his business partner lost their fur factory, the Germans 
confiscated everything in the factory and put a sign on the factory 
doors that read “No dogs or Jews allowed.”34 Her father’s business 
partner came to her room one night beaten and bloodied after 
trying to enter the factory. He eventually went into hiding around 
the same time that the Germans enforced a new law requiring all 
Jewish men to register. After registration, her brother, her only 
sibling, was taken away for “labor” near the Russian border. Soon 
after, her father was taken away on a train to a destination 
unknown. Her mother and herself were then separated the 
following day and put onto two separate trucks. At first, 
Weissman-Klein feared for the fate of her family members that had 
been stripped away from her one-by-one, and the tortuous things 
she feared they would be subjected to. Then finally, she died her 
emotional death: “Finally, I could suffer no longer. My eyes 
remained dry. I felt my features turn stony. ‘Now I have to live,’ I 
said to myself, ‘because I am alone and nothing can hurt me 
anymore.’”35  
A similar feeling is seen in the testimony of Mordechai 
Podchlebnik (1907–1985), one of the only two survivors of the 
Chelmno extermination camp. In an interview for Shoah, director 
Claude Lanzmann asked Podchlebnik what had died in a fellow 
prisoner. Podchlebnik answered, “Everything died. But he’s only 
human, and he wants to live. So he must forget.”36 The film also 
includes the testimony of Abraham Bomba, a Jewish barber. 
 
33 Gerda Weissman-Klein, All But My Life (New York: Hill & Wang, 1995), 95. 
34 Ibid., 95. 
35 Ibid., 95. 






During his interview with Lanzmann, he was asked, “How did that 
feel?” To which Bomba answered, “I will tell you something. To 
have a feeling over there was hard to do. It was hard to feel 
anything at all. You work day and night with dead bodies; you 
were also dead.”37  
Delbo expresses this same void in her book, None of Us 
Will Return, in which she states, “The will to resist was doubtlessly 
buried in some deep, hidden spring which is now broken, I will 
never know. I thought of nothing. I felt nothing.”38 Delbo also 
describes this feeling when she writes about an hours-long roll call 
in Auschwitz: “Someone says, ‘I think we’re being ordered back.’ 
But within us, nothing replies. We have lost consciousness and 
feeling. We had died to ourselves.”39 The emotional death Frankl 
describes occurs in almost every Holocaust survivor, as their 
ability to push all needs aside in favor of their instinctual will to 
stay alive is what makes them resilient when faced with the trauma 
of living in the camps.  
The emotional death, though necessary for survival 
according to Frankl, is present but not obvious in the memoir 
written by Weinberg. While many other Holocaust testimonies 
reveal several instances of self-reflection about the circumstances 
of camp life, including the moment when the survivor decides that 
the only thing they have left is to live, Weinberg’s does not. 
Instead, he chooses to focus on what happened, and not how it 
affected him. He writes about his work assignments, traveling 
between the camps, the people he meets, and the news he hears 
about the war, but writes on very few occasions about his own self-
reflection. At the beginning of his memoir, Weinberg discusses 
how he “saw without seeing, smelled without smelling, and 
 
37 Shoah. 
38 Charlotte Delbo, None of us will return (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1968), 
64. 
39 Delbo, Auschwitz and After, 35. 
 




touched without touching.”40 This is the closest to an emotional 
death that he provides the readers with throughout his memoir.  
Frankl, believing that the choices man makes are always 
completely his own, may argue that it was intellectual stability that 
made Weinberg more resilient to the emotional death and other 
emotional turmoil suffered during his time in the camps. Frankl 
does not believe that traumatic events like the Holocaust could 
alter an individual’s true self. This ideology is in stark contrast to 
Langer, who believes it is the experiences that shaped the person, 
not their mind. Based on Frankl’s ideology, Weinberg was more 
resilient than other survivors because of his intellectual 
background. But according to Langer’s ideology, Weinberg was 
just more reluctant to share the less-than-human instances of his 
time in the camps for fear of their decisions being held to the moral 
standards consistent with contemporary society. 
There is, however, another explanation for some survivors’ 
reluctance to share self-reflection in regard to their anguished 
memories. Langer mentions that sometimes survivors have trouble 
believing their own stories because such a traumatic event is 
difficult to understand, especially in a time where that horror no 
longer exists. To survivors of the ordeal, the events of the 
Holocaust seem like a different reality. Testimonies often reveal 
survivors actively trying to deal with their own disbelief at their 
stories while telling them.  
In some cases, an interviewer may lose the memory of 
some of these stories unintentionally, which is the case with the 
testimony of Hanna F., a Holocaust survivor who lived through 
Auschwitz twice. During an interview disclosing her experience, 
the interviewers asked Hanna F. how it was she was able to 
survive. When she stated that she survived out of stupidity, the 
interviewers “laughed deprecatingly, overriding her voice with 
their own ‘explanation,’ as one calls out, ‘you had a lot of guts!’”41 
When she tried to explain herself, the interviewers laughed again 
 
40 Weinberg, 67–79. 






and the interview was cut at this point, robbing the world of 
information, and robbing the survivor of her testimony. Langer 
argues that interviewers should be careful of offending or 
interrupting the survivor. By interjecting where unnecessary, 
interviewers deprived the historiography of the Holocaust of some 
vital information that could have been extracted from Hanna F.’s 
testimony.  
Langer also introduces French philosopher Maurice 
Blanchot’s idea of “wounded space.” This concept argues that 
survivors must separate themselves from their current identities to 
go back to their repressed and haunted personalities, or their 
“wounded space,” to retrieve memories.42 This is perhaps a good 
explanation for the lack of self-reflection in Weinberg’s memoir. 
He did not want to have to revisit the horrors of his wounded 
space, so he skipped over them altogether, opting instead to mainly 
focus on the day-to-day details of camp life. Levi did the same in  
Survival in Auschwitz, a book that is lacking in self-reflection but 
heavy on the psychological observation of others. The majority of 
the self-reflection found in Levi’s own anguished memory can 
usually be understood by reading his collection of essays, The 
Drowned and the Saved.  
Langer adds his idea of “wounded time” to explain 
Blanchot’s “wounded space”: “As memory plunges us into the past 
to rescue the details of the Holocaust experience, it discovers that 
cessation plays a more prominent role than continuity.”43 He then 
gives two examples of survivors having to come to terms with 
“wounded time,” a world that went on without them while they 
were trapped in another. Survivors often wondered about their 
family, whether they were alive or dead, even though some felt it 
no longer mattered, especially as their time in the camps went on.  
Langer finishes his explanation of anguished memory by 
arguing that interviewers should disregard the concept of time 
while listening or interviewing survivors because time does not 
 
42 Langer, 64. 
43 Ibid., 75. 
 




exist in the same way for them. Delbo explains that, “We are in a 
place where time is abolished.”44 Later in her testimony, she 
reiterates this point; her explanation helps name her third book: 
“The time you measure is not the measure of our days.”45 Most 
prisoners had little or no concept of time. With no sure-fire way to 
keep track of time, they lived day-by-day. Levi states in his 
testimony that “we had not only forgotten our country and our 
culture, but also our family, our past, the future we had imagined 
for ourselves, because, like animals, we were confined to the 
present moment.”46 In the words of Blanchot,  
 
The experience of the disaster obliges us to 
disengage ourselves from time as irreversible. If we 
are to master the meaning of wounded time, as it 
afflicts the voices in these testimonies, there appears 
to be no alternative to immersing ourselves in the 
shifting currents of its discontinuous flow.47  
 
Part Three: Humiliated Memory and the Besieged Self 
 
Langer’s concepts of “humiliated memory” and “the besieged self” 
refer to the memory of humiliating things a prisoner had to subject 
themselves to in the ghettos, on the trains, and in the camps.48 For 
example, cattle cars that transported prisoners had no bathroom 
facilities, so prisoners had to relieve themselves in front of 
hundreds of others. Humiliated memory violates a survivor’s sense 
of self. What was humiliating before and after the Holocaust was 
commonplace during it. As surviving the camps became less 
likely, morals, laws, and justice ceased to exist. As Levi explains, 
“We believe that the only conclusion to be drawn is that in the face 
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of driving necessity and physical disabilities many social habits 
and instincts are reduced to silence.”49 Ryan Piccirillo, author and 
Boston University graduate, supports this idea: “Within the camps, 
prisoners were not treated like humans and therefore adapted 
animalistic behavior necessary to survive.”50 In other words, the 
tragedy of the Holocaust launched twentieth-century European 
society backward, in contrast to the previous century. 
The nineteenth century saw the rise in intellectualism and 
industrialization, bringing forth great minds such as German 
philosopher Friederich Nietzsche (1844–1900), Austrian 
neurologist Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), and Swiss psychiatrist 
and psychoanalyst Carl Jung (1875–1961), men who spoke 
frequently about the power of the unconquerable human spirit. 
Frankl, being one of these men, frequently mentions the 
unconquerable human spirit. He explains throughout the book that 
ultimately, man is self-determining. He argues that “the sort of 
person the prisoner became was the result of an inner decision, and 
not the result of camp influences alone. Fundamentally, any man 
can, even under such circumstances, decide what shall become of 
him—mentally and spiritually.”51 He supplements this claim by 
stating that while some prisoners behaved “like swine,” others 
behaved “like saints.”52 Based on the chapter “The Drowned and 
the Saved” in Survival in Auschwitz, not to be confused with the 
essay compilation of the same name, it seems Levi agrees that 
some prisoners did not let their circumstances corrupt their 
morality, but that these “saints” were very few: “Survival without 
renunciation of any part of one’s own moral world was conceded 
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only to very few superior individuals, made of the stuff of martyrs 
and saints.”53  
Frankl also explains that to survive, the prisoners had to 
give themselves a reason to live: “Any attempt to restore a man’s 
inner strength in the camp had first to succeed in showing him 
some future goal. Nietzsche’s words, ‘He who has a why to live for 
can bear with almost any how.’”54 Levi explains throughout his 
testimonies that in order to live, prisoners gave themselves a 
“why” by focusing on living through subsequent small events 
rather than living till liberation. For example, in the winter, 
prisoners were focused mainly on surviving the cold. When the 
camp thawed in the spring, only then did the prisoners notice their 
hunger. Then hunger, not cold, became their priority.  
They also had to hold onto whatever hope they could find, 
even if it was small. Levi writes, “Strange, how in some way one 
always has the impression of being fortunate, how some chance 
happening, perhaps infinitesimal, stops us crossing the threshold of 
despair and allows us to live.”55 He then gives an example: “It is 
raining, but it is not windy. Or else, it is raining and windy, but you 
know that this evening it is your turn for the supplement of 
soup.”56 He believes that the strength the prisoners needed to go on 
was found this way. Similarly, Delbo believes that the strength to 
go on living was found in giving oneself a purpose. She states in 
her memoir that during their imprisonment, she and her block 
mates “spoke even more of the future, and the future acquired 
definition. We were making many plans. We never stopped 
making plans.”57 
Langer’s ideology about this seems to be at odds with 
Delbo, Frankl, and Levi’s ideologies. He explains that prisoners 
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had nothing to look forward to and that they were incapable of 
looking forward or hoping for anything because their spirits were 
shattered beyond repair. For many, there was no light at the end of 
the tunnel. Survivors’ spirits were completely broken; the Nazis 
had taken everything from them, their family, their health, their 
morals, their belongings, and sometimes even their faith in God. 
Even liberation did not provide relief to most prisoners. Instead, 
they were forced to take on a whole new set of challenges. Langer 
writes, “the details uncovered by humiliated memory dispute the 
claim still advanced by many commentators that the invincible 
human spirit provided an armor invulnerable to Nazi assaults 
against the self.”58  
The previous century of industrialization made central 
Europe one of the most advanced societies of the twentieth century 
but the Holocaust virtually undid everything that the European 
people had accomplished up until that point. According to Langer, 
“The quest for pinnacles that infatuated the nineteenth-century 
mind and left a strong imprint on our own ended in the ashpits of 
Auschwitz and other death camps, where upward striving could do 
nothing to allay the human ruin.”59 Before the Holocaust, people 
used the lessons of the past to explain the present; the tragedies of 
the past were understood as a means to an end. They were taught to 
believe in happy endings. As Nietzsche says, “looking into the past 
urges them towards the future, it incites them to engage in life, and 
kindles the hope that things will turn out well and that happiness is 
to be found behind the mountain toward which they are striding.”60 
According to Langer, this is why the Holocaust is so difficult for 
many interviewers, and the population in general, to understand. 
There was no happy ending. No good came from the near 
extermination of the Jews and others deemed “undesirable” by the 
Nazis. The tragedy of the Holocaust goes against human nature 
and the human spirit which needs to believe in happy endings to 
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survive: “humiliated memory runs contrary to the hopes and 
expectations of the audience and of its own other 
self...consciousness is always longing for happy endings.”61  
The testimonies of survivors are repressed by humiliated 
memory because it requires the survivor to reveal things about 
themselves that were less-than-human or unhuman-like by current 
societal standards but that, during wartime, were required for 
survival. The Holocaust deprived human beings of the very things 
that make them human not just the physiological things such as 
sleeping and eating, but psychological things as well, such as their 
ideas of morality and right and wrong. The physical scars would 
eventually heal, but the emotional scars would remain far past 
liberation. As Langer explains, “it is clear from the struggle of 
many witnesses, from their expressions as well as their words, that 
they inhabit two worlds simultaneously: the one of ‘choiceless 
choice’ then; the other of moral evaluation now.”62  
Frankl’s experience did not seem to affect his sense of self 
the way it affected the others, but during his time in the camps, he 
carefully observed the mental states of his fellow prisoners and 
saw many examples of humiliated memory and the diminished 
self:  
 
Under the influence of a world which no longer 
recognized the value of human life and human 
dignity, which had robbed man of his will—under 
this influence the personal value suffered a loss of 
values...he lost the feeling of being an individual, a 
being with a mind; he thought of himself then as 
only a part of an enormous mass of people, his 
existence descended to the level of animal life. And 
we, the sheep, thought of two things only—how to 
evade the bad dogs and how to get a little food.63 
 
61 Langer, 110. 
62 Ibid., 83. 







But food was scarce in the camps. Prisoners were given tiny 
fragments of bread with a thin spread of margarine only on certain 
days. The soup they were served was about as nutritious as hot 
water. Because of the scarcity of food, many prisoners had to 
resort to stealing to keep themselves alive. Stealing in the camps 
was often referred to as other things. Levi refers to stealing as 
“inheriting.”64 In her book, Five Chimneys, Holocaust survivor 
Olga Lengyel (1908–2001) prefers to use the term “organizing” 
rather than stealing.65  
The prisoner, as a result of stealing, would begin to bargain 
with his diminished self about the acts he was committing that did 
not adhere to the conscience of the person he was before the 
camps. Levi discusses “inheriting” in Buna, a subcamp of 
Auschwitz:  
 
Everything that can be stolen is stolen as soon as 
attention is relaxed. To avoid this, we had to learn 
the art of sleeping with our head on a bundle made 
up of our jacket and containing all our 
belongings...they had to be carried along always and 
everywhere...if I find a spoon lying around, a piece 
of string, a button which I can acquire without 
danger of punishment, I pocket them and consider 
them mine by full right.66 
 
Frankl explains that he had acquired some mittens by means of 
“inheriting” them from a patient who had recently died of typhus. 
Langer gives plenty of examples where a survivor describes how 
they would often, at least in some way, hope for sick patients to die 
so that they could get warmer clothes, better-fitting shoes, or that 
person’s food ration.  
 
64 Levi, Survival in Auschwitz, 33. 
65 Olga Lengyel, Five Chimneys (Chicago, IL: Chicago, 1995), 56. 
66 Levi, Survival in Auschwitz, 33–37 
 




In another example, Lengyel writes that in the camps, 
stealing was often referred to as “organization.”67 Words such as 
“theft” and “steal” were typically avoided, as they had, up until 
this point, always been used to describe a selfish act and thus went 
against prisoners’ ideas of morality. Stealing in the camps was 
different, as it was an act that was committed only to stay alive. 
According to Lengyel,  
 
The washroom would have made a fine field for a 
moralist’s observations. Sometimes an internee was 
able to clean up. If she did, her clothing would have 
been stolen. In the camp, thievery became a science 
and an art. Women who had been mothers of honest 
families, who formerly would not have taken a 
hairpin, became utterly hardened thieves and never 
suffered the slightest feeling of remorse.68  
 
Clothes were rare commodities with many prisoners wearing worn 
mismatched shoes that were for the same foot. Many inmates 
would steal clothes to keep themselves alive, especially in the 
winter months. There was also a black market operating in the 
camps in which the inmates could sell clothes that were 
“organized” for vital necessities like bread or margarine.69  
Lengyel herself, while exhibiting several episodes of 
morality such as refusing to perform sexual favors for food, 
occasionally committed acts of “organization” to ensure her own 
livelihood. One of these humiliated memories took place during a 
barter in a camp. A woman promised Lengyel a rare food item 
known as a “plazki” in exchange for aspirin tablets for an 
earache.70 Being a worker in the infirmary, Lengyel often carried 
aspirin with her. However, supplies for patients in the infirmary 
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were very scarce and by giving this woman aspirin, a patient who 
needed it more would not be able to receive any. In her testimony, 
Lengyel wrestles with this memory that haunted her: “I had abused 
my standing in the camp for personal welfare. In normal 
circumstances I would not have stooped so low. But I was at 
Auschwitz, and I was starved.”71  
Lengyel, and others in her position, cannot be blamed for 
their selfish acts. Levi states that “the ordinary moral world ceases 
to exist; the meanings and applications of words like ‘good,’ ‘evil,’ 
‘just,’ and ‘unjust’ begin to fuse and the differences between these 
polar opposites become unclear.”72 When faced with the choice 
between life-saving calories or to help ease the pain of another 
prisoner, the line between right and wrong becomes indiscernible 
and this moral conflict becomes a major part of humiliated 
memory. 
Prisoners also had to constantly be on guard against 
“organization” and “inheritance.” Weissman-Klein miraculously 
survived the death march that four thousand women were forced to 
go on when the Allies were closing in on Germany all because of 
the ski boots that her father had insisted she wear months prior. 
However, it was due to great personal sacrifice that Weissman-
Klein survived. Women who previously never stole anything 
apathetically stole shoes off their fellow prisoners while they slept 
and often Weissman-Klein had to go without sleep or give up 
pieces of her rations to keep her boots. Weinberg was not lucky 
enough to have ski boots. Instead, he “inherited” socks and boots 
when his old ones wore out by taking them off decaying corpses he 
found on the death march.73 In addition to valuable, life-saving 
articles of clothing, prisoners had to steal food as well if they 
wanted to stay alive. Food rations varied based on the prisoner’s 
job but the vast majority of prisoners were not given near enough 
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food to stay alive. Hunger and malnourishment killed slower than 
exposure to the elements did but they were far more brutal. 
When hunger reaches the point of starvation, humans 
regress as their learned traditions, morals, and values give way to 
their pure, raw, natural survival instincts. One survivor recalls 
being so hungry during his imprisonment in the camps that he ate 
from trash cans; another survivor ate human flesh from a hand 
blown off in a bombing.74 Lengyel and her bunkmates smeared 
toothpaste on their bread rations. Weinberg survived solely off of 
the sugar and chicory mixture left at the bottom of the barrels of 
“coffee” that they served: “the taste was revolting but it was full of 
calories, I doubt I would have survived without it.”75 Prisoners 
became informants to the Germans or worked extremely 
traumatizing jobs, such as serving in the Sonderkommando, for 
extra portions of food, or they would  secretly hope for a fellow 
prisoner to die or become sick so that they could eat that person’s 
ration of bread.76  
However, the violation of the self during the Holocaust 
involved so much more than just the things prisoners had to resort 
to in order to acquire sufficient food and clothing. Prisoners were 
often kept in close quarters with dozens or hundreds of others 
without any source of light and with nowhere to relieve 
themselves. An example of this is seen in the testimony of Malka 
D., a munitions worker in Radom, Poland. Langer quotes, 
“Because of some irregularity, the SS took thirty Jews and locked 
them in a dark cellar without windows. Malka D. was most 
troubled by the lack of toilet facilities. She tells the interviewer that 
the men tied strings around themselves so that urine wouldn’t 
come out.”77  
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Jewish people had lived in Europe for hundreds of years 
and had established their own culture, traditions, businesses, and 
lifestyles. They were artists, teachers, scientists, and philosophers. 
Malka D. says in her testimony that they were civilized and thus 
horrified at being reduced to relieving themselves in front of 
others. Survivor Pierre T.’s testimony says the same thing: “they 
have made us lose our civilized ways. Gradually you become a 
different person. And you do things that you would never think 
you’d do.”78 Piccirillo rephrases a passage declaring that “in order 
to survive one must forego the notion that it is a basic human right 
that a person should not have to endure humiliating un-
cleanliness.”79  
Weissman-Klein explains how she and several hundred 
others had contracted an intestinal disease or parasite during a 
march. They were given a wooden barrel and told that overfilling it 
would result in rampant beatings: “We had to run all night, stand in 
line, and plead for our turn. When the SS women came in the 
morning, they beat us, calling us every filthy word in their 
vocabulary.”80 Delbo mentions that they were unable to bathe or 
change their clothes for months on end. They would be shaved to 
ward off diseases like typhus but being allowed to bathe would 
have been much more effective at reducing infection rates of 
typhus and other diseases.81 By shaving their prisoners instead of 
allowing them to bathe, the Germans robbed their prisoners of their 
dignity. 
Auschwitz survivor Jean Amery (1912–1978) describes in 
detail the violation and theft of dignity in the camps. During one 
incident, a Kapo tried to hit him and he ducked. He held onto that 
one piece of rebellion against his captors, stating, “I didn’t stand 
firm like a cliff, but ducked. And still, I tried to initiate 
proceedings to restore my dignity, and beyond physical survival 
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that provided me with just the slightest chance to survive the 
nightmare morally also...the deprivation of dignity was nothing 
other than the potential deprivation of life.”82 Amery eventually 
committed suicide. His ability to live his life was taken from him, 
as well as his personal dignity which he held sacred. The right to 
grieve for his loss was also taken from him the same as it was 
taken from many Holocaust survivors, such as Edith P., who, 
according to Langer, “was exiled first from normal living or 
normal dying, and now from normal grieving.”83 Edith P. also tells 
her interviewer of the devastation that humiliated memory wrecks 
on survivors: “Physical pain you can stand, but how can you bear 
emotional pain? My body healed, but my soul never healed. I had 
been humiliated. I want to share it with someone who knows me 
really. There isn’t even a grave to go and cry to. It’s not easy to 
live this way.”84  
It is critical that interviewers and writers not tread lightly 
when it comes to the concept of humiliated memory and the less-
than-human aspects of Holocaust survival. Every experience must 
be investigated in its natural state, not censored for audiences. 
Langer explains that “we lack terms of discourse for such human 
situations, preferring to call them inhuman and thus banish them 
from civilized consciousness,” instead of talking about them. 85 But 
when it comes to trying to understand the Holocaust on a deeper 
level, every topic must be approached, without caution or 
censoring.  
The human spirit needs and strives for happy endings, even 
when they do not exist. Many of the testimonies reviewed express 
the desire of the interviewer (representative of the modern 
population) to skip over the rough parts and instead speak 
chronologically about survivors’ experiences, ending with 
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liberation. Langer states that history often gets written without 
these kinds of episodes of human struggle:  
 
They remain exiled from concepts like human 
destiny, clinging to the stories that constitute their 
Holocaust reality until some way is found to regard 
such stories as an expression rather than a violation 
of contemporary history.86 
 
Interviewers, intellectuals, and historians have to be careful 
not to disregard certain uncomfortable parts of human history that 
do not fit in with current societal standards if they want to maintain 
as much accuracy as possible when documenting historical events 
such as the Holocaust.  
 
Part Four: Tainted Memory and the Impromptu Self 
 
Langer describes tainted memory as “a narrative stained by the 
disapproval of the survivor’s own present moral sensibility...it is a 
form of self-justification, a painful validation of necessary if not 
always admirable conduct.”87 This kind of memory is very similar 
to humiliated memory in that current societal morals, values, or 
standards tend to condemn, even if only subconsciously, victims’ 
actions that were necessary to survive in the camps. However, 
humiliated memory dealt more with actions that violated the 
victims’ sense of self, such as having been forced to relieve 
themselves in front of others or eat trash or rotting food to survive. 
In contrast, tainted memory deals more with the ethical and moral 
choices victims made against others to either survive the camps or 
avoid them entirely. These choices, though necessary at the time of 
their occurrence, would be looked down upon now. Therefore, 
some survivors have trouble talking about them in interviews. 
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 To make these kinds of choices necessary for survival, two 
things had to happen. The first is that the victims had to become 
self-ish, in other words, victims had to focus on nothing but 
themselves if they wanted to survive. Langer explains the 
difference between “self-ish” and “selfish”:  
 
The selfish act ignores the needs of others through 
choice when the agent is in a position to help 
without injuring one’s self. It is motivated by greed, 
malice, and indifference. The former victim who 
describes self-ish acts is aware of the needs of 
others but because of the nature of the situation is 
unable to choose freely the generous impulse that a 
compassionate nature yearns to express.88  
 
This is where tainted memory and humiliated memory sometimes 
overlap. When discussing tainted memory, Langer includes plenty 
of examples where survivors felt ashamed for doing nothing when 
witnessing atrocities committed against another person. However, 
their inaction would not be considered a “selfish” one since it is 
not motivated by greed or malice. It instead is motivated by the 
person’s instinctual desire to live. Doing something in some 
situations might have meant death for the intervener. In the context 
of tainted memory, refusal to act would be deemed a “self-ish” act 
instead.  
One example of a “self-ish” act is seen in the testimony of 
Myra L. who describes a male neighbor whose sister-in-law came 
to visit him one night in the Lodz ghetto. The woman begged the 
man for a slice of bread for his older brother who was dying of 
starvation. The neighbor cried, but ultimately refused his sister-in-
law stating, “I have no food myself, how can I give him my last 
slice of bread?”89 This act is a self-ish one. The neighbor did not 
deny his brother the life-saving bread out of greed or malice, but 
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out of the need for his own survival. Myra L. expresses later that 
“the survival will was so big that nobody was sacrificing himself 
for anybody else.”90 This tainted memory, without a doubt, 
permanently scarred the younger brother, who survived, and whose 
older brother did not.  
 Another psychological insight of the diminished self 
apparent in Frankl’s written testimony is how the camps brought 
out the apathy in its inhabitants. Frankl believes this apathy was 
partially a defense mechanism, a self-ish act by the mind that 
convinced the prisoner that apathy was necessary for his own 
survival. In a concentration camp, the prisoner could not afford to 
worry about anyone else. His primary, and often only focus, was 
keeping his own body healthy enough to avoid the next inevitable 
selection. Another part of it though is  
 
hunger, lack of sleep, and the general irritability 
which was another characteristic of the prisoner’s 
mental state. The fact that we had neither nicotine 
nor caffeine [commodities that prior to internment, 
prisoners had had for the majority of their lives] 
also contributed to the state of apathy and 
irritability.91  
 
 There are several examples of tainted memory in Night, a 
testimony written by Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel (1928–2016) 
that describes his experiences with his father in the Auschwitz-
Buchenwald camp. As a healthy fifteen-year-old at the time of his 
deportation to Auschwitz, the camp life was not as hard on him as 
it was for his fifty-year-old father. He lived in the same camp as 
his father and often did most of the same jobs. When his father was 
repeatedly beaten by Kapos for not working fast enough or 
marching correctly during many different job assignments, Wiesel 
was forced to watch in silence. However, he was not forced to 
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remain silent by the Germans, but rather by his preservation of 
self. 
In Wiesel’s first few days at Auschwitz, his father was 
struck so hard he fell to the ground. Wiesel recalls, “I stood 
petrified. My father had been struck and I had not even blinked. I 
watched and kept silent. Only yesterday, I would have dug my 
nails into this criminal’s flesh. Had I changed that much? So 
fast?”92 Later, in 1944, Wiesel and his father were sent to Buna, a 
subcamp of Auschwitz. His father’s health had already begun to 
decline and Wiesel was forced, yet again, to watch his father be 
beaten. This time, however, instead of just remaining silent, Wiesel 
thought about trying to leave to avoid the blows himself. The terror 
and heartbreak of watching his father be beaten no longer mattered 
to him: “I had watched it all happening without moving. I kept 
silent. I thought of stealing away in order not to suffer the blows 
myself. That was what life in a concentration camp had made of 
me.”93 Recalling when his ailing father was taken to the 
crematorium, Wiesel remembers: “It pained me that I could not 
weep, but I was out of tears. And deep inside me, if I could have 
searched the recesses of my feeble conscious, I might have found 
something like: Free at Last!”94 Wiesel of course loved his father, 
but when faced with the choice between helping his father and his 
own personal survival, he often chose the latter. What consumes 
Wiesel throughout his experience in Auschwitz is what Langer 
calls the “impromptu self.”95 
 The “impromptu self,” the second part of tainted memory, 
is the version of the self that develops spontaneously when the 
larger self is exposed to significant amounts of trauma. This 
impromptu self takes over in times where the victim has to make 
choices in what Langer calls “crucial moments—situations 
requiring a split-second response that often made the difference 
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between life and death.”96 The impromptu self makes choices that 
a victim otherwise would probably not make. For example, one 
survivor named Mira B. describes her attempt to save her brother 
by convincing him to put on one of her dresses after being rounded 
up for “labor.” The brother did not believe he was going to be put 
to death. Instead, he believed he was merely going to be working.97 
The brother’s impromptu self never emerged because he did not 
believe that he was in any danger. Langer believes that “the 
illusion that he was still in control of part of his destiny inactivated 
the impromptu-self—and sealed his doom.”98  
There are plenty of other examples that show how the 
impromptu self sometimes saved the victim. For instance, in a 
testimony by Leon S., Leon printed up fake papers for himself and 
his Jewish wife once the Nazis arrived in Poland. The Poles 
discovered he was a Jew after confirming that he was circumcised 
and threatened to hand him over to the Germans. Leon’s 
impromptu self then came up with a speech delivered so well it 
convinced the Pole not to hand him over.99 In another example, 
Irving F. hid with his wife and child, amongst other family 
members in a hidden cellar. When their hideout is discovered, 
Irving hid in a grain oven in which he is never found, while the rest 
of his family was taken away. He sacrificed his family to save 
himself: “What saved him was not a plan, but a desperate 
movement that preserved only him in a roomful of relatives.”100 
 In a discussion of her job as a worker at the camp’s 
infirmary and the things she had to do that went against her moral 
compass, Lengyel recalls, “We five whose responsibility it was to 
bring infants into the world [while in camp] felt the burden of this 
monstrous conclusion which defied all human and moral law.”101 
 
96 Langer, 151. 
97 Ibid., 154–155. 
98 Ibid., 155. 
99 Ibid., 152. 
100 Ibid., 150. 
101 Lengyel, 113. 
 




The Nazis did not want the prisoner’s newborn infants to survive. 
Lengyel states that pregnant women who arrived at the camp were 
always sent to the left which meant certain death. Women that 
were very early in their pregnancy and thus sent to the right would 
give birth in camp. When the baby was born, both the newborn and 
mother were sent to the crematory, where the still-alive newborn 
was tossed into the crematory first as “kindling,” with the mother 
soon to follow. However, women whose babies were stillborn or 
miscarried were permitted to stay in camp.102 Lengyel and the five 
other inmates with healthcare experience who worked in the 
infirmary were forced to kill newborn infants and present them as 
stillborn to the Germans. This way, they bargained, at least they 
saved the mother’s life. What is viewed today as a disgusting and 
immoral action was necessary at Auschwitz. Lengyel painfully 
writes,  
 
The Germans succeeded in making murderers of us. 
Our own children had perished in the gas chambers 
and we dispatched the lives of others before their 
first voices had left their tiny lungs. I try in vain to 
make my conscience acquit me. I marvel to what 
depths these Germans made us descend!103 
 
 The impromptu self seems to work as a way to rid the 
victim of guilt, much like Lifton’s idea of doubling. Langer 
explains, “once the impulse to stay alive [the impromptu-self] 
begins to operate, the luxury of moral constraint temporarily 
disappears.”104 The mind suppresses everything other than the urge 
to stay alive when exposed to significant amounts of trauma. The 
victims may lose all moral control and they are free from guilt 
while fighting to stay alive, but once the moment has passed and 
they are safe, the guilt returns. Perhaps this is why the liberation 
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stories that interviewers so desperately crave never seem to satisfy. 
The victim, after the ordeal is over, has to live with the choices 
they made against people they loved to save themselves because 
“personal survival lives in the permanent shadow of family 
loss.”105 Alex H., for example, expresses his desire for there to be 
meetings where survivors can “speak out and be reassured that 
[they aren’t] some kind of beast or animal.”106 Another survivor, 
Leo G., states,  
 
I envy people that can get out of themselves for one 
minute sometimes. They can laugh, enjoy 
themselves. Anybody in my situation cannot. How 
can you? How can you enjoy yourself? It’s almost a 
crime against the people you lost that you can live 
your life and enjoy yourself.107 
  
Delbo feels differently about this. In one of her poems 
called “Prayer to the Living to Forgive Them for Being Alive,” she 
writes about trivial things that most people are worried about, such 
as money, and begs people to do something meaningful with their 
lives so that the ones who died did not die for nothing: “I beg you, 
do something, learn a dance step, something to justify your 
existence because it would be too senseless after all for so many to 
have died while you live doing nothing with your life.”108 Levi 
explains his thoughts about guilt or shame after liberation: 
 
In the majority of cases, the hour of liberation was 
neither joyful nor lighthearted. For most it occurred 
against a tragic background of destruction, 
slaughter, and suffering. Just as they felt they were 
again becoming men, that is, responsible, the 
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sorrows of men returned: the sorrow of the 
dispersed or lost family; the universal suffering all 
around; their own exhaustion...the problems of a life 
to begin all over again amid the rubble, and often 
alone.109 
 
The dormant emotional trauma that had no place in the camps 
often returned at the point of liberation. To many survivors, 
enjoying what was left of their lives after liberation felt like a 
crime against the people they loved and lost. 
Despite all the good qualities that oral testimonies provide, 
the ones dealing with tainted memory are a struggle. Langer 
contends that,  
 
Oddly enough, [survivors] say little of their Nazi 
oppressors, they wrestle instead with the dilemma 
of their own identity and the impossibility of 
functioning as a normal self. They struggle with the 
incompatibility between the impromptu-self that 
endured atrocity and the self that sought 
reintegration into society after liberation.110  
 
Weinberg discusses this same dilemma after his liberation by 
American GIs at Buchenwald. He explains, “While day-to-day 
survival had been my main concern, I had not done much thinking, 
so liberation called for a reappraisal of my life.”111 On Liberation 
Day, as Weissman-Klein viewed a white flag waving over a Czech 
church steeple, she realized she should be happy. She even hides 
another one of their friends’ death from a mutual friend because 
Liberation Day is supposed to be happy. But after the trauma she 
had endured over the past four years, she felt anything but happy:  
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As I look back now, trying to recall my feelings 
during those first hours, I actually think that there 
were none. My mind was so dull, my nerves so 
worn from waiting, that only an emotionless 
vacuum remained. Like many of the other girls I 
just sat and waited for whatever would happen 
next.112  
 
Many survivors had no family, no home, and no money once 
liberated; they had nothing left to return to. They just had to live 
day-by-day, similar to what they were doing before liberation. 
 
Part Five: Unheroic Memory and the Diminished Self 
 
Finally, this last hidden memory explores the diminished self as it 
deals with Langer’s term “unheroic memory.”113 Langer critiques 
several Holocaust scholars whose works include several accounts 
of martyrdom, self-sacrifice, or heroism. Langer believes that most 
commentators, Holocaust historians, and authors  
 
cling to a grammar of heroism and martyrdom to 
protect the idea that the Nazi assault on the body 
and spirit of its victims did no fundamental damage 
to our cherished belief that, even in the most 
adverse circumstances, character is instinctively 
allied to the good.114 
  
Langer compares these commentators to Dante and Virgil walking 
through the inferno with flowers sprung about. While the setting is 
nice, they are still in the inferno.115  
 
112 Weissman-Klein, 213. 
113 Langer, 169. 
114 Ibid., 162. 
115 Ibid., 165. 
 




One testimony tells of a young Jewish teen named Matilda 
who chose not to run away from the Nazis with her friends but 
instead chose to go home and be with her family. Most 
commentators see her actions as heroic. But Matilda did not have 
any idea what would happen to her if she chose to stay with her 
family, so she did not make this kind of a decision while knowing 
the consequences. Therefore, “[h]er decision is, of course, 
admirable, though made at a time when the certainty of dying had 
not yet been absolutely established.”116 Langer then argues that 
commentators and interviewers are, by elevating Matilda to 
heroism, essentially condemning her friends who chose to flee. 
Matilda, having had all the information, might have chosen another 
path. She may have lived through years of torture only to be 
“liberated” and discover that her entire life she knew, including all 
her family members, was gone. That is unheroic memory.  
More examples can be found in Weissman-Klein’s memoir. 
Her brother Arthur, mentioned earlier, registered himself for 
German labor despite his family protesting against it after hearing 
what happens to those who willingly go. His actions can be seen 
by his family, friends, and neighbors as heroic during the time, but 
he did not believe the stories of what would happen to him for 
having gone, or he might have chosen otherwise. His impromptu 
self never activated since he was not fearful for his life. After 
having been told by her father not to leave her mother, young 
Weissman-Klein jumped out of a truck that was meant to carry her 
to a different camp than her mother:  
 
Just then Merin [a high-ranking Jewish leader from 
Sosnowitz who cooperates with the Germans in 
rounding up the Jews; Weissman-Klein calls him 
the King of the Jews] passed. He looked at me, and 
with strength unexpected in that little man, he 
picked me up and threw me back onto the truck. 
‘You are too young to die.’ Strange that the man 
 






who sent my mother to death had pushed me into 
the arms of life.117  
 
Weissman-Klein’s actions could be seen as heroic, but at this 
point, she had not yet seen a concentration camp so she was not 
fearful of what would have happened to her if she had not been 
pushed back onto the truck. She just wanted to go with her mother.  
Lengyel lived in Hungary in 1944 with her parents, her 
husband, and her two sons. In her testimony, she gives two major 
accounts of unheroic memory, choices she made that unknowingly 
led to her family’s demise. The first happened while they were still 
in Hungary. Her husband was arrested and was to be deported to 
“Germany” right away to work as a doctor. She insisted that the 
Germans allow his family to go with him, but she unknowingly led 
them to Auschwitz with her husband.118 The second occurred while 
deboarding the train that carried them there. Her youngest son was 
sent to the left, or to “the children’s and old persons camp” as the 
Germans called it. Her oldest son was younger than twelve but 
large for his age. The German asked her if he was able to work, 
stating that he looked at least twelve.119 Had Lengyel said he was 
old enough, he would have been sent to work and had a chance to 
survive. However, she states that: “I wanted to spare him from 
labors that might prove too arduous for him...How could I have 
known? I had spared them from hard work, but I had condemned 
my son and my mother to death in the gas chambers.”120 By trying 
to save her family, she had condemned them to death, albeit 
unintentionally.  
From the immediate post–war period and well into the 
twenty-first century, the Jewish Councils that ran the ghettos under 
Nazi supervision were hit with heavy criticism. They were accused 
of “complying” or “coordinating” with the Germans by allowing 
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them to transport the more vulnerable citizens of the ghettos for 
“resettlement.” The Councils knew, though, that “it was impossible 
to save the entire ghetto community…since not all Jews could be 
saved, it was better to deliver to the Nazi Moloch those ghetto 
dwellers with little or no chance of survival in order to save 
others.”121 The Councils were put into an impossible situation, one 
where morals could not reside. Logic had to overrule morality if 
they were to have any hope at all of saving any Jews from 
deportation. Because they made this decision based on logic and 
not morality, they cannot be held accountable for a decision that 
led to death. The decision to give up some to save others can be 
looked at heroically, while in contrast, the decision not to stage 
resistance may be looked at by some as unheroic. The reality is 
that the situation (and most situations during the Holocaust) does 
not allow for judgment of either kind.  
Langer states that “unheroic memory is disheartened by the 
subversive realities that it recovers.”122 As understanding as it is to 
hope for episodes of heroism and defiance in Holocaust 
testimonies, it is an unrealistic and nearly impossible expectation. 
The experiences victims suffered took away their humanity and 
diminished their spirit and sense of self to the point where all 
actions taken were those necessary for survival. Once 
physiological survival became near-certain, usually, at the point of 
liberation, unheroic memory came back to haunt the survivors of 
the camps in the form of both actions and inactions. Their minds 
began to bargain with themselves, asking things such as “why 
didn’t I resist?”  
Levi recalls a man who had resisted and was then hung just 
days before the Soviet soldiers liberated the camp. His last words 
sought to assure his fellow prisoners, “Don’t worry, I’m the last 
one.”123 Levi then reflects upon this, stating that he did not think 
much of the man’s last words until after liberation: “This is a 
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thought that then just barely grazed us, but that returned 
‘afterward’: you could have, you certainly should have.”124 Future 
regret over inaction is a common example of unheroic memory. 
Chaim E., a survivor who was part of a small detail of 
workers at Sobibor, was one of ten men who tried to escape while 
on a work assignment by killing their Ukranian guards and running 
into the forest. While some may see this action as heroic or defiant, 
Chaim E. did not: “We were not human beings, we were just 
robots who happened to eat and happened to do things...so all the 
logic doesn’t apply there.”125 He believed that heroism could not 
exist in the kind of circumstances the victims were in. He recalls, 
“urgent immediate needs crippled such ideas.”126 Heroism cannot 
exist in a situation where the hero has no choice, as Chaim E. 
claimed. Later in his testimony he also explained that “idealistic 
things didn’t have any place there; only survival for your skin, 
that’s what counted.”127 Surviving mattered; little else did. 
Langer argues that the integrity of Holocaust testimonies 
will only be protected by the interviewers’ ability to accept that 
their ideas of heroism and defiance are different than the way that 
survivors see them. Everything the survivors did came down to the 
human instinct for survival. Ideals such as heroism had no place in 
such a traumatic event. It seems Weinberg agrees with Langer on 
this point when he proclaims, “I am thankful, but never proud, to 
have survived the camps. In my view we, the survivors, are all 
somewhat compromised. We did not sacrifice our lives so that 
others might perhaps stand a slightly better chance at living.”128 He 
then explains what it is that makes a survivor: 
 
As it is, survival feels less like a heroic act than like 
having won a lottery against truly astronomical 
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odds. It is easy to fantasize that there must have 
been some underlying reason for one’s survival, but 
in the end it was probably just a combination of 
chance and an aptitude for self-preservation.129  
 
He is not alone in this theory. Levi believes some qualities were 
apparent in people who happened to survive, usually qualities that 
are seen as negative outside of the context of the Holocaust. He 
says several times that thieves, swindlers, and the like tended to 
survive while all the morally just prisoners died.130 However, he 
also believes that in the end, survival came down to luck, and he 
admits that luck, or chance, was probably the biggest factor. 
Ideals such as heroism were also illogical. Hypothetically, 
even if the will to survive was taken out of the equation and acts 
committed by survivors were purely heroic in nature and not out of 
instinct for survival, many survivors still would not have acted out 
of heroism because one defiant action usually led to reprisals. 
During the death march that Weissman Klein was in, fourteen 
women were lined up in front of the others and shot by the SS for 
their attempt to escape.131 In the days leading up to this, she had 
been planning her own escape with four of her friends. Her close 
friend, Ilse, finally told Weissman-Klein that she was afraid:  
 
Until then I had not been afraid; excitement had 
buried my fear. Only when Ilse showed her fear did 
my doubts come to the surface. What if our plan did 
not go well? The decision [to escape] was not mine 
alone: Ilse’s life was as dear to me as my own. At 
that moment I vowed that I would never try to 
escape, never take our lives into my own hands.132  
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Weissman-Klein could hear the artillery fire of the Russian army 
so close behind them. If they escaped, they would have just had to 
hide and wait for nightfall to be liberated and, had the decision 
affected her alone, she may have done so. But she could not stand 
the reprisals for her actions affecting her friends or other innocent 
women who had chosen to stay with the formation.133  
Another example of repressed heroism can be read in 
Chaim E.’s testimony. After his work detail tried to escape, they 
witnessed reprisals. Survivor Luna K. reminds us that anyone 
“‘who felt that he wanted to perform an act of resistance was an 
individual who had to make a conscious choice right then and 
there, that he will not only commit the rebellious act, but he along 
with himself will take with him scores of people.’”134 A defiant act 
might not only get the perpetrator shot, but it might get innocent 
victims shot along with him. The Nazis also might have chosen to 
leave the perpetrator alive so that he can see the deaths that his 
“heroic” action brought upon his fellow innocents. Many of the 
survivors Langer writes about describe acts of defiance or heroism 
as “foolish,” knowing that any action done by them could kill 
dozens of innocent people. Acts such as these were likened to 
murder by survivors.  
The Jewish Councils (mentioned previously) were also 
repressed from heroic acts because of, amongst many things, the 
fear of reprisals. In the Vilna ghetto on July 22, 1943, members of 
the Jewish United Partisan Organization escaped. When they were 
caught, the Gestapo chief ordered the escapees’ families to be 
delivered to him, as well as the families of the leaders of their labor 
units. If the escapee had no family, then his neighbors, and in some 
cases his entire building, would be rounded up and shot. One 
witness wrote down the following:  
 
The responsibility for these deaths falls onto those 
who betrayed our ghetto community and all its 
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serious tasks in the full knowledge that they were 
endangering the existence of our entire ghetto and 
the lives of their loved ones in the first place. They 
are responsible for the spilt blood.135 
 
Langer analyzes a study done by Charles Taylor, named 
Sources of the Self: The Making of a Modern Identity, in which 
Taylor speaks about what he calls “the good life,” or, in other 
words, the life that existed for the survivors before the Holocaust. 
When imprisoned in the camps, “the ‘good life’ and the ‘right 
thing to do’ lost their relevance because particular situations did 
not allow the luxury of their expression.”136 The “goods that 
command our awe” is what Taylor uses to describe things like 
family unity, parental devotion, and sibling loyalty, all of which 
are things that are lost in the Holocaust. Langer concludes that,  
 
[W]hen the ‘goods that command our awe’ 
suddenly collapse on the ramp at Auschwitz, then 
identity groped for alternative moorings—and 
somewhere in our philosophical investigations, we 
must find room for the diminished self that resulted, 
the one whose voice echoes sadly but frankly from 




Langer’s work, the information and analysis provided in the 
additional testimonies, and Viktor Frankl’s psychological insight 
help put the study of Holocaust testimonies into an entirely new 
perspective that allows readers to understand the tragedy on an 
even deeper level. It would be naive to believe that the Holocaust 
ended at the point of liberation because the ramifications of the 
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Holocaust are everywhere, not only living in the memories of the 
survivors but in the absence of the ones who did not survive. To 
honor their memory, survivors share their stories, and it is the duty 
of contemporary society to listen. To understand Holocaust 
testimony, it is imperative to understand these types of 
memories—deep, anguished, humiliated, tainted, and unheroic—in 
the context of the situation in which they were experienced. 
Attempting to understand these testimonies using contemporary 
standards runs the risk of misinterpreting or not absorbing the 
information, ultimately changing the historiography of the 
Holocaust.  
With deep memory, survivors can unconsciously omit 
emotional information and focus only on concrete facts to protect 
their minds from going “back there.” With anguished memory as 
well, survivors may sometimes be hesitant to give information: 
what happened to them during the Holocaust and the life they live 
now are two completely different worlds. Some may have a hard 
time believing their own memories because their experience was 
so unprecedented; it happened in what was supposed to be one of 
the most advanced, modernized civilizations of the world. In some 
cases, shame may prevent survivors from revealing events that 
violated their dignity, as in the case of humiliated memory. 
Similarly, the guilt of the tainted memory may prevent them from 
revealing events that forced them to violate their ideas of morality. 
Finally, many survivors do not see their actions as heroic; they 
were forced into situations that gave them no opportunity to act 
heroically. With unheroic memory, survivors often recall that the 
most heroic thing one could do was usually nothing at all.  
Understanding these types of memory by listening to both 
oral and written testimonies is crucial to understanding the whole 
picture of the Holocaust, not just the general frame. It is the 
responsibility of the coming generations of humanity to 
acknowledge and understand the testimonies provided by the 
survivors, to fight against the denial of the Holocaust, and to 
prevent the history of this genocide from repeating itself. But there 
are many stories that will forever go unheard and many questions 
 




that will forever go unanswered. The answer to those questions can 
only be found in the ashes, bones, and blood buried beneath the 
soil of Eastern Europe, or in the mass graves deep beneath the Nazi 
killing fields. Traces will forever be found in the memories of 
those who lived through it and were brave enough to share their 
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